What Next for the Alliance of Small Island States in the Climate Change Arena? by Brindis, Daniel
Sustainable Development Law & Policy
Volume 7
Issue 2 Winter 2007: Climate Law Reporter 2007 Article 17
What Next for the Alliance of Small Island States in
the Climate Change Arena?
Daniel Brindis
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/sdlp
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sustainable Development Law & Policy by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brindis, Daniel. “What Next for the Alliance of Small Island States in the Climate Change Arena?” Sustainable Development Law &
Policy, Winter 2007, 45, 83.
45 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY
S
mall Island States (“SIS”) fight a high stakes uphill battle
in advocating their interests in climate change treaty
negotiation. This class of 43 nations represents only five
percent of the world’s population, a miniscule portion of the
world’s gross domestic product, and is the most vulnerable class
of states to global climate change.1 The isolation of these states
and their limited capacity to adapt to natural disasters stand to
aggravate the harmful effects of climate change.2
SIS suffer from changing weather patterns, and scientists
predict that some island nations stand to lose substantial portions
of land due to sea level rise.3 Losing this land threatens these
islands’ development efforts as natural resources on the islands
become sparse.4 Island tourism, a major source for investment in
many of these States, also suffers due to shrinking resources and
unpredictable changing weather patterns.5 In recognition of the
common threat and vulnerabili-
ties of the SIS, the Alliance of
Small Island States (“AOSIS”)
was born.6
In 1994, members of
AOSIS met in Barbados and for-
mulated a strategy to confront
climate change, improve SIS
adaptability to climate change,
and make SIS development
more sustainable.7 In 2004, the
impacts of the devastating
tsunami underlined the vulnera-
bility of these island nations.
Motivated by this environmental
catastrophe, the AOSIS drafted
the Mauritius declaration, a pro-active policy strategy declara-
tion that outlines the SIS struggle to exist in the face of the threat
of climate change. These nations, gathering at the UN Confer-
ence on Small Islands in 2005, adopted the Mauritius Declara-
tion and reaffirmed and expanded the Barbados Programme of
Action.8
Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change represented light-
ning rods of participation and cooperation among SIS to encour-
age the reduction of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.9 As a
result, participation in these meetings represented a positive ini-
tial step in cooperation among the SIS.10 The synergy of SIS
gave the states more representation, resulting in SIS gaining con-
cessions to provide for financial aid and resources to help the
developing island nations adapt to climate change.11
The cooperation of such isolated States is an encouraging
example of how vulnerable parties with aligned interests can
represent themselves with a force that outweighs the sum of its
parts. The expansion and broadening of this alliance for cooper-
ation beyond SIS themselves could strengthen its force. AOSIS
and non-governmental organizations working on behalf of SIS
should focus efforts of alliances beyond climate change vulnera-
ble states to also work with vulnerable populations and coastal
lowland communities in industrialized nations that are resistant
to the GHG reduction. Although St. Lucia, for instance, and the
United States have different goals and interests at the Kyoto Pro-
tocol negotiation table, this small island nation has its interests
well aligned with areas such as Louisiana or Massachusetts,
areas that are particularly sensitive to rising sea levels. Groups
like the Climate Institute in Washington, D.C. have begun to plan
such  effor t s  th rough the i r
Endangered  Is lands  Cam-
paign.12 This campaign proposes
various partnership programs
between SIS and low coastal
cities in larger countries, one
example being “[w]orking
with the International Hurri-
cane Research Center in Miami
to ensure that state of the art
techniques for storm surge and
wind resistance planning in
South Florida are adapted for
use in [SIS].”13
Much is left to be desired in
terms of having an international
climate change policy that can protect the citizens of SIS from
rising sea levels and increasingly unpredictable and extreme
weather patterns. By broadening the links between all vulnerable
areas of the world at sub-state levels, SIS can raise awareness of
their vulnerability and lobby for the major GHG producers to
curb their emissions. The coming decades present potential
grave consequences for SIS and the major GHG producers have
a moral duty to the front line victims of climate change.
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